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Real GDP per capita and capital stock in Cote d’Ivoire 
grew strongly from 1960 to 1979, but have declined ever 
since, for twenty-five years. As a result, the country has 
traveled a full circle from economic success to failure in 
little more than a generation. What are the long-term 
factors behind this dismal growth story? Are the Ivorian 
development problems mostly of recent origin? Or there 
are more fundamental, economic factors that explain its 
long term performance? 
   Four principal conclusions are as follows:
   First, Cote d’Ivoire’s long-term growth performance 
is not fully explained by temporary factors (e.g., 
CFA overvaluation or recent conflict). Longer term 
factors such as capital accumulation, productivity, and 
terms of trade are key to understanding the country’s 
This paper— a product of the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Unit 4 (AFTP4), Africa Poverty Reduction 
& Economic Management (PREM) Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the sources 
and constraints of long-term economic growth in African countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at zbogetic@worldbank.org. 
performance as is the policy of specialization in a single 
commodity––cocoa.
   Second, the long-term decline in per capita output 
started well before the currency overvaluation, and at a 
time of political stability, and is related to a major, secular 
deterioration in terms of trade that started after 1976.  
   Third, total factor productivity estimates indicate that 
TFP per capita also grew until it hit a plateau in 1976-
78, and then shrank thereafter, despite gains in human 
capital accumulation. 
   Fourth, Cote d’Ivoire has pursued a policy of 
specialization in cocoa beans but this bet on a single 
commodity has ultimately failed. The strategy that 
brought prosperity during the 1970s resulted in a growth 
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Cote d’Ivoire: Growth, Conflict, Specialization,  
And the Terms of Trade 
 
Real GDP per capita and capital stock in Cote d’Ivoire grew strongly from 1960 to 
1979, but have declined ever since, for twenty-five years; this paper explores 
underlying, long-term factors of this development record. As a result, Cote d’Ivoire’s 
real GDP per capita in 2003 is about the same as in early 1960s and the capital stock only 
somewhat above that in the immediate aftermath of independence.1 Poverty rate 
increased from 32.3 percent in 1993 to an estimated 42-44 percent in 2003 in the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict.2 Therefore, the country has traveled a full circle 
from economic success to failure in little more than a generation.  
This paper aims to present some long-term stylized facts on Cote d’Ivoire’s growth 
performance and then explore long-term factors behind that performance using 
deterministic and stochastic total factor productivity approaches. First, we present  
long-term economic and demographic trends in the 1960-2002 period and some cross-
country comparisons, the macroeconomic and social impact of the 2002-03 conflict, and 
the key role of cocoa played in the Cote d’Ivoire’s economy. Second, we discuss briefly 
the macroeconomic impact of the most recent 2002-03 crisis as the latest episode in a 
long-term economic decline that began over two decades ago. Third, we explain the 
crucial role of cocoa and coffee sectors, cocoa and coffee prices, and, more broadly, 
terms of trade, which influence both short term and long term performance of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s economy.  Finally, we present the findings of the total factor productivity 
analysis in order to ascertain the roles of factor accumulation and productivity 
movements in explaining Cote d’Ivoire’s long-term growth. Annexes detail the 
methodologies for calculating human capital and physical capital stocks, deterministic 
and stochastic estimates of TFP (Annex 1), and further discussion of the role of the 
cocoa/coffee sector in the Ivorian and the world economy. 
1.   Long Term Economic and Demographic Trends  
There are two distinct periods in recent economic history of Cote d’Ivoire: the 
“boom” period of 1960 to (about) 1979 and the period of economic decline from 
1980 to 2002 (Figures 1-2).  This pattern is apparent whether one looks at broad trends 
in the overall, per capita real output or its components, as well as population, and labor 
force (Table 1). GDP, consumption, and investment peaked in 1979, then fell in the early 
1980s. Thereafter, the three variables recovered and began to climb, but at a slower rate 
                                                 
1 Using the World Bank’s SIMA database, in 2002, real GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars fell to US$776 
per capita, the lowest seen since it declined to $764 in 1994. GDP per capita first broached US$800 in 1964 
when it hit US$849. It thereupon faltered to $792 per head in 1965, then grew steadily to $1,376 in 1978, 
but declining thereafter.  
2 The World Bank (2003). 
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than the 1960s and early 1970s. Exports per capita did grow in real per capita terms in 
1979-2002, albeit slowly. In short, most of the significant advances achieved by Cote 
d’Ivoire in 1960-1979 were lost in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Table 1:  Summary of Growth, 1960-1979 period Versus 1979-2002 period 
(in percent) 
Compound Average Annual Growth  1960-1979  1980-2002 
Real per Capita:  
GDP, Consumption, Trade & Investment 
  
      Output (GDP) per capita  3.92 -2.40 
       Household Consumption per capita  4.07 -3.03 
       Exports per capita  2.85   1.26 
       Imports per capita   5.61 -2.90 
       Gross Capital Formation per capita  5.61 -2.90 
Population Growth  3.95   3.26 
Labor Force Growth  3.46   3.28 
 
Underpinning the per capita output decline in the second period was continued, 
rapid population growth.  During the 1960s and 1970s, economic growth was so strong 
that that Cote d’Ivoire succeeded in achieving strong per capita growth in spite of rapid 
population growth. But in 1980-2002, continuing, if moderated population growth 
overwhelmed slow growth in output, resulting in drops in per capita output, consumption, 
imports, and gross capital formation. Having achieved a real GDP level of  $1,379 per 
capita in 1978 (in 1995 US dollars), real output has fallen to under $776 per head in 
2002, which is lower than the $849 achieved in 1964! Consumption per head fell in half 
from1979 to 2002. Gross capital formation (physical investment) peaked in 1978, and 
never recovered. 
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Figure 1:  Output, Consumption, Exports, Imports, Investment 1960-2002 





































Figure 2:  Per Capita Output, Consumption, Exports, Imports, Investment 1960-2002 
Cote d"Ivoire: Per Capita Economic Indicators








































































3 COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
 
 
Figure 3:  Population, Labor Force, Urban Population 1960-2002 



























Finally, Cote d’Ivoire’s growth record also compares poorly with main comparator 
groups of countries, suggesting that country-specific rather than regional factors are 
behind this performance. Using real per capita growth data for 1993-2002,  we 
compared Cote d’Ivoire’s growth with that of several other “peer groups” or benchmark 
sets of countries
3. Cote d’Ivoire grew more slowly than developing countries worldwide, 
and slower than both sub-Saharan African countries and West African countries. Cote 
d’Ivoire also grew more slowly than most of the countries in the West CFA-franc zone, 
and slower than most countries in a set of African countries experiencing conflict during 
1993-2002. Cote d’Ivoire’s poor long-term growth cannot be dismissed as “typical” of 
either developing countries or African countries, and is not explained by the recent 
conflict.  
 
2. The Macroeconomic and Social Impact of the Crisis 2002-03 
The brief 2002-03 civil conflict
4 came on top of the two decades of declining per 
capita real GDP and rising poverty.  As such, the conflict alone does not explain the 
secular economic decline since late 1970s; it aggravated the already unfavourable long-
term economic trends. In this section, we briefly discuss the short term impact of the 
crisis, focusing mainly on the social consequences. After the 1994 devaluation, which 
triggered gains in competitiveness and four years of rising per capita income and modest 
gains in poverty reduction, in 1999-2000, the Ivorian economy was almost 
simultaneously hit by a large terms of trade shock and political turmoil. Real per capita 
                                                 
3 See the Annex for details. 
4 For details, see World Bank (2003). 
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declined precipitously, reaching a cumulative loss of about 15 percent in the period 1999-
2003, wiping out the post-devaluation gains on the income and poverty front. Poverty 
increased from 38 ½ percent in 2002 to about 42-44 at end-2003, the highest in a decade 
(Figures 4 and 5). 
Figure 4: Cote d'Ivoire: Poverty and Real GDP, 1993-2003

































Poverty  Real per capita GDP  Linear (Poverty )
Figure 5: Cote d'Ivoire: CAB and 
Real effective exchange rate, 1991-2002 














































































Current account balance to GDP
Real effective exchange rate
 
 
Source: World Bank staff live database, and IMF and Bank staff estimates. 
Notes to Figure 1.2: The linear line is a simple linear trend of the poverty series. Poverty figure for 2003 is an estimate 
based on growth elasticity of poverty and the estimated number of internally displaced people (see Table 1.2 below in 
section on the social impact of the crisis). 
 









Pre-Crisis 3.0 2.0 -0.5 -1.7
Post-Crisis -1.8 3.1 -1.5
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Post-Crisis -3.0 3.5 -1.9 7.5
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               Source: IMF and World Bank staff estimates. 
 
While post-1994 gains in competitiveness have been largely preserved, since end-
2000 there was a real appreciation of the CFA franc. (Figure 5). Since the initial 
overshooting after 1994, the real effective exchange rate remained relatively stable, 
hovering at about 30 percent below the pre-1994 level. However, since October 2000 
until end 2003, there has been a real appreciation of about 20 percent. Part of the real 
appreciation reflects the appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. But at the sectoral 
level, decline in productivity, and increased cost of production, transportation, and trade 
in industries located in the war affected areas indicate loss of competitiveness. Part of the 
regional trade and transshipment has been diverted to neighboring countries (e.g., 
Ghana).  
The Social Impact 
The social situation before the outbreak of the civil war in September 2002 had 
already been very difficult, as reflected in dramatic deterioration in the U.N. 
Human Development Index (HDI) and per capita income rank in recent years. Even 
before the 2002-03 crisis, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a major deterioration in social 
indicators and difficulties in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
According to the 2003 UN Human Development report, life expectancy was lower and 
infant mortality higher in 2001 compared with 1995, despite strong growth in the 1995-
98 period. After temporarily declining in 1998, poverty rate is estimated to have 
exceeded in 2002 its 1995 level––about 38 ½ percent of the population––erasing the 
gains in the post-devaluation years.
5 According to the latest UNDP HDI,  Côte d’Ivoire 
was ranked 161 among 173 countries, 16 ranks lower than in 1995; its income rank in 
PPP terms was 148, reflecting an equally dramatic decline from the rank of 130 in 1995. 
The highly unequal income distribution, measured by the Gini coefficient, is likely to 
                                                 
5 Institut National de la Statistique (2002). Profil de Pauvreté en Côte d’Ivoire en 2002, Abidjan (Auguste). 
6 COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
have worsened. Progress towards achieving five out of seven MDGs––those relating to 
primary education, gender equality, and health––ran far behind schedule (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Côte d’Ivoire: Progress Towards Key Millennium Development Goals, 2001 
Selected Goals and indicators  1990  1995  2000-01  Assessment 
of Progress 
Goal 1: Halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger 












Goal 2: Ensure all children complete primary education 
  Indicators:  
  Net primary enrollment ratio  




















Goal 3: Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education 
 Indicators:   
  Female net primary enrollment ratio as % of male ratio 


















Goal 4: Reduce under-5 and infant mortality rates by two thirds 










Goal 5: Improve maternal health 











Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 











Goal 7: Halve the proportion of people without access to better water 
sources 
















Source: Human Development Report, 2003, UNDP; extracted from the country tables. The table summarizes analysis 
of progress towards goals for 2015 based on linear interpolation of trends in the 1990s.  






The 2002-03 crisis worsened the social situation in a very short period of time, 
resulting in a full-fledged social and humanitarian crisis. Between 500 and 1,000 
persons were killed and about 1.2 million people––about 6 percent of the population––
became internally displaced (IDPs) or sought refuge in neighboring countries. Of this 
number, about 800,000 were internally displaced, and the remaining 400,000 left for 
neighboring countries.
6 An estimated 500-700,000 children left school and many schools 
and medical services effectively stopped operating, in part because of the departure of 
civil servants and the breakdown of the central administration in the areas controlled by 
ex-rebels. An estimated 20,000 people were rendered homeless in Abidjan as a result of 
the government’s destruction of shantytowns (quartiers précaires), which were adjacent 
                                                 
6 U.N. Report to the Secretary-General, Mission of the Humanitarian Envoy for the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, 
12 January-12 February 2003. 
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to military and other sensitive areas,
7 under the campaign to fight “the infiltration of the 
rebels.” As a result, by end-2002 poverty rate likely increased by an estimated 4 
percentage points to about 42 ½ percent of the population; with further increase in 
displaced/refugee population, it is likely to have increased by an additional 1 ½ 
percentage points in early 2003 (Table 3). In rural areas, poverty rose because of the loss 
of farmers’ crop incomes; in urban areas, unemployment and poverty rose due to closures 
of a number of large companies (e.g., SITARAIL  for example at the beginning of the 
crisis; but the rail line was later reopened following an agreement on reopening of the 
border between Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire) and dwindling activity in industry (e.g., 
textiles), transport and domestic trade. 
 
Table 3: Côte d’Ivoire - The Social Impact of the Côte d'Ivoire Crisis, 2002-03 
   1995 2002    2003   
      Pre-crisis Post-crisis   Pre-crisis  Post-crisis  
   (annual  percent  changes;  unless otherwise indicated)   
                
  GDP  7.1  3.0  -1.8    4.0  -3.0   
  GDP per capita  3.2  -0.3  -4.5    0.7  -6.3   
 Inflation (Annual average)  14.1  3.0  3.9    2.5  4.0   
 Poverty rate (percent of the population) 36.8  38.4  42.5  1/  39.5  44.0 1/
 Gini coefficient  0.37  0.37  0.40  2/  0.37  0.44  2/
 Human development index                 
     Rank among 173 countries  145  161  164  3/  164  165  3/
  Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
refugees (millions)  …  0  1.0  4/  0  1.2  4/
 Source: IMF (growth, inflation); World Bank (social indicators); U.N. (human development index).     
 1/ Poverty rate for 2002 was reported in the results of the NSI 2002 household survey Profile de 
Pauvrete en Côte d’Ivoire en 2002 (page 8). For 2003, it was calculated based on the past elasticity 
of poverty rate with respect to per capita growth and the additional poor attributable      
 to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to neighboring countries.   
 2/ Gini coefficients for 2002-03 were calculated as linear extrapolation based on changes in poverty rates.   
 3/ The rank of the HDI for pre-crisis 2002 relates to 2001; ranks for post-crisis 2002, and 2003 were extrapolated 
 based on the changes in the real GDP per capita and the additional, estimated impact of the 2002-03 crisis on the number of 
 internally displaced people and the refugees. 
 4/ Based on the data of U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
 
The adverse regional impact on the poor––mostly in rural areas–– has varied from 
moderate in the south and south-east to severe in the north and, particularly, the 
west.
8 In the south and south-east, where farming was least affected by the conflict, 
cocoa farmers also benefited from higher cocoa prices and the successful exports of most 
of their production. Coffee producers, particularly in the west, have suffered from low 
international prices, inability to collect their entire crop because of the lack of security, 
                                                 
7 A relocation operation of these displaced persons has been formulated through the World Bank supported 
PACOM project. 
8 These preliminary assessments are based on the estimated impact on farmers' income from main crops 
and the impact on displacement of farm labor, using past households surveys and existing monitoring 
systems. 
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increased local marketing margins, and the cost of roadblocks. Roadblocks alone may 
have added up to CFAF50/kg, about 25 percent to "normal" farm-gate prices. In the 
Savannah region, the social situation is probably critical: at least 30 percent of cotton 
production was estimated to have been lost, resulting in significant losses of incomes and 
a sharp rise of poverty in what is already the poorest region of the country.  
The composition of priority public expenditures
9 shifted away from education, 
health and social spending, towards military, security, and humanitarian 
expenditures. In particular, the combined share of education, health and economic 
infrastructure in 2002 was budgeted at 50 percent of total priority expenditures, but the 
actual share was only 42 percent; reported defense spending raised its share from 8.7 to 
almost 10 percent. The most pro-poor public social expenditures––on primary education 
and basic health––may have suffered disproportionately, and the incidence of HIV/AIDS 
is on the rise. The latest information suggest the incidence of HIV is much higher rate in 
the war affected regions (about 20) percent than previously reported (12 percent). The 
risk of other major diseases (malaria, cholera, and yellow fever) increased. 
Social and institutional infrastructure (e.g., schools, clinics, and local government 
institutions and agencies), especially in poor rural areas, has suffered more than the 
traditional economic infrastructure (e.g., transportation networks, water and 
electricity). Numerous schools and local medical facilities have been reportedly 
abandoned and/or looted, and the qualified local government cadre has left the most 
affected regions. Major economic infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail, ports, water, and 
electricity) have not suffered from extensive war-related damage, but there is little doubt 
that its productivity has declined as operations and maintenance and critical repair was 
postponed, requiring more costly operating and capital repair later on. Despite reduced 
receipts and arrears from Ghana, the power sector has so far withstood the crisis. 
3.  The Role of Cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire’s Economy 
Over the last forty years, cocoa output has grown to dominate Cote’ d’Ivoire’s 
economy and world production (Figure 8).  First, Cote d’Ivoire’s output has grown 
from low levels to as much as 1.4 million tons in 2001, equivalent to about 40 percent of 
world’s output. Second, the nominal and real cocoa prices on world markets generally 
rose until it hit an all-time high in 1976, then collapsed and have never fully recovered. 
Third, the share of agricultural land that Cote d’Ivoire devoted to cocoa production 
increased steadily. 
 
9 Priority expenditures include spending on education, health, economic infrastructure, mines and energy, 
agriculture, interior, defense and justice.  COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
Figure 8: World & Cote d’Ivoire Cocoa Production, World Prices,  Cocoa Land Use in Cote’ d’Ivoire, and Share of World Market 
 
Physical Cocoa Bean Production
 In the World and Cote d'Ivoire
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International Cocoa Prices 1960-2003: Estimated Spot Price, 
& Price Adusted by US Consumer Price Index (Base 1995)
 Based on near term futures prices converted to spot equivalents, 
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Cocoa as % of Arable and Permanent Crop Land
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Cote d'Ivoire Share of World Cocoa Bean Output
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Cocoa exports now dominate Cote d’Ivoire’s trade and economy.   The importance of 
cocoa exports in Cote d’Ivoire’s trade and economy increased significantly (Figure 9).  
By 2000, raw cocoa represented 80 percent of the country’s commodity exports, over 50 
percent of all exported goods and services, and 21 percent of GDP. Considering that 
several other sectors are also cocoa-related, it is clear that the country has become very 
dependent upon one raw commodity, cocoa. 
 
Figure 9: Cocoa Exports as a Percentage of Commodity Exports, All Exports (Including Services), 
and Gross Domestic Product 
Cote d'Ivoire: Cocoa Exports as a Percent of Basic Commodity Exports, of 
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Commodity price declines since 1977 have undermined the benefits of growth in 
Cote d’Ivoire’s physical cocoa output. The two periods in Cote d’Ivoire’s growth 
history exactly coincide with the price profiles on world commodity markets.  (Table 2). 
Real prices for raw cocoa, cotton and coffee increased on world commodity markets from 
1960 until they hit all-time highs in 1977. After 1977 real prices crashed, and on average 
have declined steadily ever since. Since 1977, cocoa price declines have greatly exceeded 
production increases. The results for cocoa are reinforced by developments in coffee and 
cotton during 1977-2003.  Coffee production has not increased, while real prices 
declined. Cotton output increased, but real prices fell. Simply put, raw commodity 
production in general and cocoa production in particular have been very low rate-of-
return investments for Cote d’Ivoire.  Consequently, the strategy of specialization in 
cocoa has not been successful. 
Since Cote d’Ivoire as the world’s leading cocoa producer has certain market 
power, the world price trend is not entirely exogenous.
10 Regression estimates provide 
evidence that Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa production (quantity) impacts world prices, and that a 
                                                 
10 To test the hypothesis that Cote d’Ivoire is indeed a price-maker in the world market for cocoa, we 
estimated the world cocoa price elasticity with respect to Cote d’Ivoire production quantity (in metric tons) 
an efficient fully modified least squares estimator (FM-OLS) (Phillips and Hansen (1990), Hansen (1996) 
and Gregory and Hansen (1996)). For details, see Bogetic, Espina, and Noer (2004). 
11 COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
structural break occurred in the market in about 1975, the year in which Cote d’Ivoire’s 
share of world output rose to 15 percent (Table 4). 
Table 4: Cocoa, Coffee and Cotton Market Performance Summary, Real World 
Price Trends versus Physical Production in Cote d’Ivoire 
Compound Average Annual Growth Rates 
For 1961-1977, 1977-2003, and 1961-2003 -  Raw Commodities: Cocoa, Coffee & Cotton 
Tonnage Produced in Cote d’Ivoire Versus Inflation Adjusted Prices on World Markets 
  1961-1977 1977-2003 1961-2003 
COCOA BEANS 
Production Growth (Metric Tons) 











Production Growth (Metric Tons) 











Production Growth (Metric Tons) 










Sources: Commodity production quantity data is from the FAO, and world prices in US dollars from commodity 
exchanges are provided by the IMF.  The US CPI is used to adjust for inflation.   
 
 
4.   Capital, Labor, And Total Factor Productivity 
The following estimates of the capital stock, human capital, and output per worker 
are hoped to shed light on the underlying, long-term factors behind Cote d’Ivoire’s 
growth performance.  We begin by discussing the evolution of the capital stock and 
then an estimate of the educational attainment of the labor force.   
Physical Capital Stock 
Since 1982, Cote d’Ivoire’s capital stock has declined with the short-lived exception 
of the immediate post-devaluation years (1995-99). Capital stocks are known to be  
difficult to measure, flows less so. Our estimate of the capital stock uses the conventional 
“perpetual inventory method” based on gross capital formation, an initial capital stock 
and a depreciation rate of 10 percent
11 (Figure 10). According to our estimate, after 1979, 
the increase in the real capital stock of the entire economy slowed dramatically and since 





                                                 
11 For details of the estimate and the sensitivity to initial capital stock and depreciation assumptions, see 
Annex 1. 
12 COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
Figure 10:  Estimate of Physical Capital Stock, 1960-2002 









































































Per capita capital stock has also declined dramatically over the past two decades 
(Figure 11).  According to these estimates, per capita real output and physical capital 
grew strongly until 1979, then fell precipitously. From a peak of over $7,000 per worker, 
capital stock fell to about $2,500 per worker in 2002, estimated in 1995 dollars. Real 
output per worker fell from a peak of nearly $3,400 to only $2,000 in the same period. 
Figure 11:  Per Capita Output and Physical Capital Stock, 1960-2002 
Cote d'Ivoire: Real Physical Capital (K/L)












































13 COTE D’IVOIRE: Growth, Specialization and the Terms of Trade 
 
Human Capital  
Educational attainment is clearly associated with human capital, and is used in the 
literature as a proxy for human capital or “labor force quality”.  This indicator is 
commonly used to measure “human capital” or  “effective labor force.”   
Human capital, as measured by educational attainment, has risen in Cote d’Ivoire 
since independence (Figure 12). This is evidenced by an estimate
12 of the average years 
of schooling per worker for the period 1960 to 2002
13.  Since most educated persons 
work, most youth entering the labor force are educated, and as average years of schooling 
for those who do attend school is rising, the estimated average schooling of workers rises 
much faster than the basic literacy rate for the entire population. One important caveat: 
this estimate does not take into account the likely impact of AIDS on human capital, 
which has been particularly important since mid-1980s. 
Figure 12:  Estimate, Average Years in School Per Worker, Cote d’Ivoire, 1960-2002 






































































































































                                                
 
 
12 This “labor quality” estimate is described in detail in the Annex, and permits us to estimate total factor 
productivity in the next section. 
13 Comprehensive data on educational attainment is lacking for Cote d’Ivoire. The best readily available 
measure of educational attainment in terms of completeness over time is the literacy rate, as measured in 
surveys as reported by the United Nations.  For the entire population over 15 years, the literacy rate 
climbed from 21% in 1970 to about 48% in 2000.  For youth, the rate rose from 33% in 1970 to about 60% 
in 2000.  See further explanations in the Annex. 
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Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
We present here both deterministic and stochastic estimates of TFP.  First we discuss 
the results of a  “deterministic” or “accounting” approach to TFP. Then we present results 
of a productivity regression which estimates these parameters. Considerable detail is 
relegated to the Annex 1. 
Deterministic Accounting Estimate of TFP 
One conventional approach, first followed here, is to use national income data and 
other information with assumed parameter values, and simply compute estimates of 
TFP in a deterministic fashion.
14  Our TFP accounting estimate is presented in Figure 
13
15. The rate of growth of capital stock per worker is derived from the estimates of 
capital stock, and the growth in human capital from the increase in average schooling 
discussed in the earlier section. 
Figure 13: Estimate of Total Productivity Per Worker, 1960-2002 


































Total Factor Productivity (TFP) grew until about 1978, then declined substantially 
thereafter. This estimate shows TFP per worker in Cote d’Ivoire to have risen from 1960 
until 1979, then to have turned around and declined thereafter. By 2002 TFP per worker 
                                                 
14 See Mahajan (2003).  We provide a comparison between out estimates and these other estimates in the 
Annex 1.  
15 The approach described in detail in the Annex 1 is used to compute the contributions of the growth rate 
of physical capital per worker and changes in average schooling to the growth rate of output per worker. In 
the base year, TFP is normalized by assuming that it equals unity.  Then, one computes the levels by 
computing the cross products from t = 0 to time period t of one plus the rates of growth for time periods 
zero to t.   
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had fallen steadily by 50 percentage points since 1979, and TFP was lower than it had 
been in 1960 (off 30 percentage points). Alarmingly, TFP has trended downward strongly 
since 1998, boding ill for the future. Depending upon how one chooses to interpret TFP, 
Cote d’Ivoire is experiencing negative technological progress, or negative gains in 
efficiency over time. The value added above and beyond the contributions of physical 
and human capital appears to be shrinking.
16  
 
According to this estimate, the steady decline in output per worker in the Cote 
d’Ivoire in the 1980s and 1990s is not just a result of falling capital stock per 
worker.  It also appears to be a result of falling total factor productivity per worker.   
Stochastic Regression Model of Factor Productivity 
An alternative approach, a stochastic regression model of factor productivity (which 
estimates parameter values) is also used to evaluate the validity of the deterministic 
TFP analysis in the last section.
17 The results were satisfactory, especially when on 
considers that the sample is small, the main explanatory variables were estimates that we 
constructed, and that many analysts had major difficulties with the data on countries from 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
18 We ran a multivariate, Cobb-Douglas style “factor” model of 
productivity, which uses our estimate of capital stock per worker and adds a term for 
human capital, in this case a term representing our estimate of average schooling per 
worker.  The coefficient point estimates for physical capital and labor are close to what is 
expected
19. While the estimate for physical capital seems robust and precise, the human 
capital coefficient estimate has a wide confidence interval and low T-statistic.   
 
The terms of trade appear to account for at least part of the decline in TFP.  The 
concept of “Solow-residual” TFP is not directly observable; there is no times series of 
direct observations to rely upon.  For regression analysis, economists have traditionally 
used proxy variables or instrumental variables. But, in Cote d’Ivoire specifically and (and 
in some other developing countries
20), TFP growth over time is not a simple quasi-linear 
trend. Proxies or instruments must be carefully selected. We noted during the analysis 
that the TPF measured by the accounting (i.e., deterministic) method had a time profile 
rather similar to the time profile of the terms of trade. In this context, if world prices for 
commodity exports increase, the resulting additional value added contributes to the 
“residual”, TFP.  If, on the other hand, prices of imported production inputs increase, the 
                                                 
16 Note that if we are overestimating the contribution of either factor, for example overestimating human 
capital by overestimating schooling or “worker quality”, the net result would be to underestimate TFP.  
17 See Bosworth & Collins (2003), Cohen & Sots (2001), and Ghosh & Kraay (2000) 
18 For example, Bosworth and Collins (2003) did not extend their global TFP estimates to Africa in their 
paper “The Empirics of Growth: An Update”, September 22, 2003.  
19 See the Annex 1 for a detailed analysis of expected parameter estimation results. The schooling 
coefficient point estimate comes in at b2 = 0.0553, not far from the “ballpark” expected value of 0.079 
(which we would revise downward anyway if we accept the proposition that Cote d’Ivoire has a high MPK 
and hence a > 0.35).   
20 See for example Bosworth and Collins (2003), specifically the graphs in second page of the Appendix.  
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residual value added is reduced. That is, for a small trading economy, the terms of trade 
affects the value added of production.
21   
Table 5: Regression Estimation Results of a Factor Productivity Model  
for the Cote d'Ivoire, 1960-2002 






T-Statistic      
Delta Log, Capital per Worker  0.56473  4.31 
Delta, Average Schooling per Worker  0.05528  0.32 
Delta Log Terms of Trade  0.10019  2.77 
Constant -  0.00465  0,17 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.9607        R-Squared: 0.52               F(5,36) = 13.5 
ADF test on residual: Z(t) = -6.153  > 1% Critical Value 
 
A one percent change in the rate of change in terms of trade results in a one-tenth of 
a percent change in the measured real value of per capita output. Table 5 presents the 
coefficient estimates, measures of “goodness of fit”, and tests of certain hypotheses about 
parameter values, for a regression “explaining” the rate of growth of output per worker as 
a result of the growth rate of physical capital per worker, the increase of average 
schooling per worker (representing growth in human capital), and the rate of change of 
the terms of trade.
22 The rate of change of the terms of trade is taken as an important 
determinant of or proxy for Total Factor Productivity
23. A one percent change in the rate 
of change in terms of trade results in a one-tenth of a percent change in the measured real 
value of per capita output. A dummy variable added for the internal conflict in 2000-2002 
provided an estimate that conflict knocked -3.8% off the expected growth rates for those 
three years, for a cumulative effect of 11% for the three years. 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
The preceding analysis suggests several conclusions, an important policy implication for 
diversification, and some avenues for further research on Cote d’Ivoire’s economy. 
 
First, Cote d’Ivoire’s  long-term per capita growth performance is not fully 
explained by either the over-valuation of the CFA in late 1980s and early 1990s, nor 
by the recent conflict. While the impact of the conflict was severe––especially on the 
social front––longer term factors such as capital accumulation, total factor productivity, 
and terms of trade are key to understanding the country’s performance over these four 
                                                 
21 For a trading nation, the prices of exports and imported inputs already appear in the national income 
accounting statistics used to compute TFP.  In the Annex 1, we first present an intuitive explanation, and 
then an algebraic manipulation of national income identities to show the link between the terms of trade 
and TFP. 
22 The coefficient point estimates for the contributions of physical capital and human capital (schooling) 
differ somewhat but not significantly from the values often assumed in the literature, and from those which 
were assumed in the accounting TPF estimate presented earlier. 
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decades as is, in part, the choice of development policy in the early 1970s and earlier to 
specialize in cocoa and massively expand cocoa bean production. This is notwithstanding 
the facts that part of this specialization was an endogenous response of cocoa farmers to 
high international prices and that some diversification did occur with the development of 
light manufacturing and food processing. 
 
Second, the long-term decline in per capita output is related to the secular 
deterioration in terms of trade.  The per capita decline in output started well before the 
pronounced currency overvaluation, and at a time of political stability.  It is related to a 
major deterioration in terms of trade that started after 1976.   
 
Third, total factor productivity estimates indicate that TFP per capita grew until it 
hit a plateau in 1976-78, and then shrank thereafter despite gains in human capital 
accumulation. A Cobb-Douglas productivity regression validates the accounting TFP 
estimate and provides evidence for a major turnaround and subsequent, secular 
deterioration in the terms of trade, which partly explains the decline in per capita output 
and falling TFP.  
 
Fourth, reflecting partly a strategic choice of development policy in the 1970s, Cote 
d’Ivoire has become heavily specialized in cocoa bean production and its exports, 
and has steadily increased physical cocoa output. This strategy brought prosperity 
during the 1970s when real cocoa prices rose,  but turned for the worse when cocoa 
prices dropped steadily after 1976 presaging the long-term economic decline since 1978-
80. (empirically, Cote d’Ivoire began to exercise market power on the world price of 
cocoa in 1975 when its share of world output increased beyond [15 percent].). Worse, 
coffee and cotton prices—two other major export commodities––exhibit the same profile. 
A related long-term trend reinforcing the terms of trade impact was the depreciation of 
the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the French franc since the 1985 Plaza Accord. As a result, the 
government’s strategy of cocoa specialization has been defeated by cocoa and other 
commodity price trends. In short, the bet on a single raw commodity to finance 
development efforts failed. The dependence upon cocoa seems to be at least one 




Looking forward, Cote d’Ivoire faces twin challenge for development policy of both 
short-term (restoring stability on political and security fronts) and long-term nature 
(restarting structural reforms). While ending the conflict is important for short-term 
economic recovery and political stabilization, it is only a first step towards sustainable 
recovery.  Improving governance at all levels, restructuring and diversifying the economy 
for more balanced, long-term growth will be critical in reversing the long-term economic 
trends of the past two and a half decades. 
                                                 
24 This points to at least two areas for further analysis: (i) volatility: the extent to which commodity-related 
volatility has impacted growth in Cote d’Ivoire,24 and (ii) competitiveness: Cote d’Ivoire’s 
competitiveness and real effective exchange rate, issues dealt with in two separate background papers to the 
Cote d’Ivoire’s Development Policy Review. 
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Diversification opportunities should be identified and pursued vigorously.  Cocoa 
takes seven years to become commercially productive after initial planting, and has a 
useful life of three to four decades. The investment in productive cocoa acreage 
represents sunk costs, and it may not pay to uproot and replant with another crop.  But 
cocoa first planted in the 1960s and 1970s may be nearing the end of its useful life. 
Therefore, studies on agricultural, technological, and financing aspects of the feasibility 
of using some of the land for planting some other crop or economic activity with higher 
value added potential, rather than replanted with cocoa, may be timely. Such studies may 
also help Cote d’Ivoire to develop a timely diversification strategy and action plan 
leading to actual diversification while avoiding re-investment expenses. Given its global 
market power, Cote d’Ivoire’s reduction in cocoa output may help raise cocoa prices 
somewhat, thereby raising returns on the remaining acreage.  Studies of the feasibility of 
replacing cocoa acreage on an orderly basis, and developing a broader diversification 
strategy, and an implementation plan, might contribute to a less specialized and more 
robust economy. 
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ANNEX ONE: Methodological Notes 
 
This annex provides detail on the estimates of human and physical capital underlying the 
total factor productivity analysis, as well as further detail on the TFP analysis. 
Estimating the Average Schooling of Workers 
Figure A-1 shows annual estimated literacy rates from SIMA for Cote d’Ivoire for 1970 
through 1998, for the entire adult population aged15 years and older.   
Figure A-1: Adult Literacy Rate in the Cote d’Ivoire, 1970 to 1998 















































































Below we provide step-by-step detail on our procedure for estimating the average years 
of schooling per worker in Cote d’Ivoire.   
•  First, the adult literacy rate for 1970 through 1998, available in the Bank’s SIMA 
database (new Development Data Base––DDP), was extrapolated back to 1960 
based on the 1970-1980 rate of  increase, and forward to 2002 based on the 1988-
1998 rate.    
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•  We then calculated the total number of adults in the population by subtracting the 
number of children 14 years old and under from the total population; both series 
are found in the Bank’s SIMA (current DDP database). 
 
•  Next, we estimated the rate at which literate adults participate in the labor force.  
The assumed “literate labor force participation rate” is very high, but trending 
down somewhat as literacy increases. The assumption is that there is career 
training specialization in Cote d’Ivoire. In the largely rural environment, persons 
planning to remain engaged in the within-household production typically do not 
invest in an education and hence often remain illiterate while persons planning to 
participate in the formal labor force seek education. 
 
•  This allowed us to estimate the literacy rate among workers. Due to the low but 
rising literacy rate in the population, and the high proclivity among the educated 
to participate in the labor force, the labor force is much more literate than the 
general population of adults. 
 
•  We estimated the average number of years in school or average educational 
attainment for literate persons.  The regular social surveys of Cote d’Ivoire ask 
this question of a fairly large sample of respondents. In 2002, for example, the 
average schooling per worker was 7.7 years, higher in urban areas and in industry, 
lower in rural areas and in agriculture.  There is also some information as to how 
long students stay in school, conditional upon whether or not they enroll in the 
first place  
 
•  The average schooling per worker in the labor force is the product of the 
estimated labor force literacy rate times the estimated average schooling of those 
who are literate. 
 
The accompanying  table A-2 below provides the data and estimates used.  The estimated 
average schooling per worker developed here is higher than those typically encountered 
in the literature (for example, Pradeep Mahajan (2003), Bosworth & Collins (2003) or 
Cohen & Soto (2001)). Some authors do not provide estimates for Cote d'Ivoire (e.g. 
Barro et al) while others cite problems with the data from Sub-Saharan Africa. Some 
seem to rely on the literacy rate of the general population as a proxy for educational 
attainment of the work force. 
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1960 1,661,248 15.3 2,114,981 95.0% 306,849 18.5% 8.00 1.48
1961 1,711,845 15.8 2,174,059 94.9% 325,146 19.0% 8.09 1.54
1962 1,765,456 16.3 2,238,940 94.7% 345,174 19.6% 8.18 1.60
1963 1,822,394 16.8 2,308,487 94.6% 366,868 20.1% 8.27 1.66
1964 1,882,216 17.4 2,383,550 94.4% 390,474 20.7% 8.36 1.73
1965 1,946,157 17.9 2,464,980 94.3% 416,261 21.4% 8.45 1.81
1966 2,013,312 18.5 2,557,870 94.1% 445,261 22.1% 8.54 1.89
1967 2,083,992 19.1 2,658,330 94.0% 477,010 22.9% 8.63 1.98
1968 2,158,245 19.7 2,764,218 93.8% 511,295 23.7% 8.72 2.07
1969 2,235,864 20.4 2,877,389 93.7% 548,628 24.5% 8.81 2.16
1970 2,317,403 21.0 2,996,693 93.5% 588,981 25.4% 8.9 2.26
1971 2,402,141 21.9 3,119,827 93.4% 636,590 26.5% 8.99 2.38
1972 2,490,541 22.7 3,249,510 93.2% 687,955 27.6% 9.08 2.51
1973 2,581,709 23.5 3,383,556 93.1% 741,135 28.7% 9.17 2.63
1974 2,675,590 24.4 3,521,768 92.9% 797,483 29.8% 9.26 2.76
1975 2,771,577 25.2 3,660,944 92.8% 855,908 30.9% 9.35 2.89
1976 2,868,308 26.1 3,809,494 92.6% 920,132 32.1% 9.44 3.03
1977 2,967,209 26.9 3,961,276 92.5% 986,836 33.3% 9.53 3.17
1978 3,068,637 27.8 4,117,104 92.3% 1,056,313 34.4% 9.62 3.31
1979 3,172,940 28.6 4,277,783 92.2% 1,129,317 35.6% 9.71 3.46
1980 3,280,058 29.5 4,443,110 92.0% 1,205,239 36.7% 9.8 3.60
1981 3,388,229 30.4 4,608,436 91.9% 1,285,489 37.9% 9.89 3.75
1982 3,498,568 31.2 4,776,628 91.7% 1,368,224 39.1% 9.98 3.90
1983 3,611,804 32.1 4,949,439 91.6% 1,455,425 40.3% 10.07 4.06
1984 3,727,472 33.0 5,125,611 91.4% 1,545,085 41.5% 10.16 4.21
1985 3,846,493 33.8 5,304,875 91.3% 1,638,437 42.6% 10.25 4.37
1986 3,966,477 34.8 5,501,659 91.1% 1,742,070 43.9% 10.34 4.54
1987 4,088,315 35.7 5,701,181 91.0% 1,849,775 45.2% 10.43 4.72
1988 4,212,331 36.6 5,904,212 90.8% 1,961,466 46.6% 10.52 4.90
1989 4,337,698 37.5 6,108,507 90.7% 2,078,054 47.9% 10.61 5.08
1990 4,465,120 38.5 6,315,820 90.5% 2,201,098 49.3% 10.7 5.27
1991 4,657,352 39.5 6,587,682 90.4% 2,351,770 50.5% 10.79 5.45
1992 4,853,652 40.6 6,860,165 90.2% 2,509,271 51.7% 10.88 5.62
1993 5,053,141 41.6 7,134,183 90.1% 2,672,004 52.9% 10.97 5.80
1994 5,257,650 42.6 7,407,652 89.9% 2,838,797 54.0% 11.06 5.97
1995 5,465,944 43.6 7,680,485 89.8% 3,007,444 55.0% 11.15 6.13
1996 5,647,560 44.6 7,995,054 89.6% 3,197,941 56.6% 11.24 6.36
1997 5,824,421 45.7 8,296,921 89.5% 3,388,530 58.2% 11.33 6.59
1998 5,998,989 46.6 8,585,057 89.3% 3,576,049 59.6% 11.42 6.81
1999 6,167,442 47.6 8,857,427 89.2% 3,762,489 61.0% 11.51 7.02
2000 6,332,383 48.8 9,113,000 89.0% 3,957,071 62.5% 11.6 7.25
2001 6,504,772 50.0 9,383,000 88.9% 4,164,835 64.0% 11.69 7.48
2002 6,671,252 51.2 9,637,000 88.7% 4,372,606 65.5% 11.78 7.72  
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Estimating the Capital Stock: Sensitivity to Initial Capital and Depreciation 
We followed a conventional approach in the literature in using the “perpetual inventory” 
estimates of capital stock based on accumulated gross capital formation (investment) 
adjusted for depreciation.  Such estimates are sensitive to the assumptions employed.   
We assumed that gross capital formation was available to facilitate production within the 
recorded year. Investments in upgrading agricultural land are typically made just prior to 
planting, so the benefit of the capital stock is enjoyed in the same year. Vehicles and 
machinery are similarly employed right away. 
We assumed a depreciation rate of 10%. Others sometimes assume 6% or 8%.  We argue 
for the 10% rate in this case on the grounds that capital investments made in a developing 
tropical agricultural country in general, and Cote d’Ivoire specifically, depreciate quickly. 
Tropical arable land will return to forest quickly if not rigorously maintained. Rural 
building of local construction similarly depreciates quickly, unless kept up. Machinery 
and vehicles are worked very hard and so also wear out quickly.  
The basic algorithm used here was that current physical capital stock equals last year’s 
capital stock less depreciation of 10%, plus this year’s gross capital formation. Some 
analysts use the assumption that investment takes time to mobilize in production, and 
update last period’s depreciated capital with last periods gross capital formation, when 
computing current period capital stock.  
For presenting descriptive statistics we used data from SIMA/DDP database and worked 
in constant US dollars per capita, to facilitate reader’s comparisons with the statistics of 
other countries outside the CFA zone. For Figure 10 and for Figure 11 in the main text 
above, we assumed an initial per worker capital stock of US$ 2,200 in 1995 dollars. For 
constant CFA, this amount was translated at 240 CFA per dollar.  For the productivity 
regressions, as is common in the literature, we used constant local currency units under 
the argument that producers make their production choices based on local not world 
prices. (For CFA Franc countries the differences between dollar prices and local currency 
unit prices are not very large)  
Next, we test the initial capital and depreciation rate assumptions in constant 1995 CFA 
Francs. Figure A-2 shows the profile of the capital stock assumption over time for the 
baseline, and then with an initial capital stock reduced by the CFA equivalent of $1,000, 
and then increased by $1,000.  Varying initial capital stock by almost 50% has amazingly 
little impact on the time profile of capital stock over time, and no discernable impact after 
ten or twelve years. Part of this may be sue to the fact that the baseline assumes a 10% 
depreciation rate. 
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Figure A-2: Cote d’Ivoire - Sensitivity of Capital Stock Estimate to plus or minus $1,000 in Initial 
Capital Stock (in 1995 CFA equivalent) 
Sensitivity of Capital Stock Estimate 
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Figure A-3: Cote d’Ivoire – Sensitivity of Capital Stock Estimate to the Depreciation Rate 
Assumption – 4%, 6%, 8% and 10% 
Sensitivity Of Capital Stock Estimate 
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Next, we considered four different depreciation rates (Figure A-3).  Here the difference in 
levels persists throughout the time series.  In particular, the peak capital stock level in 
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1983 increases from CFAF 9.6 trillion (depreciation rate =10%) to CFAF 10.79 trillion 
(depreciation rate = 8%) to CFAF 12.38 trillion (6%) to CFAF 14.25 trillion (4%).  The 
lower the depreciation rate, the longer capital “stays in the system,” so the peak slides 
from 1982 (at 10%) to 1983 (at 6% or lower). 
But, the time profile of capital stock remains remarkably similar for quite different 
depreciation rate assumptions.  In particular, regardless of the depreciation rate used, 
gross capital stock in the economy flattens or decreases after the early 1980s.  So, almost 
regardless of the depreciation rate chosen (within a wide range), the method generates the 
estimate that capital stock per worker began to decline after the early 1980s. 
It appears that when using the “perpetual inventory” method of estimating capital stock, 
the main determinant of capital stock seem to be the investment flows, or gross capital 
formation. Initial capital stock and the depreciation rate, although important, are by 
comparison second-order determinants. This is reassuring as the perpetual inventory 
method is fairly robust in the presence of uncertainty about initial capital and 
depreciation. 
Calculating TFP and Productivity Regressions 
Calculating Total Factor Productivity  
Conceptually, output is generated by a production function which uses as inputs factors 
of production: physical capital; human capital (which is the labor force adjusted for 
quality), and a host of other factors.  Physical capital can be inferred from observed 
investment flows. Human capital can be estimated based on the labor force and 
educational attainment.  The effect of all other factors, or total factor productivity (TFP), 
is commonly estimated as the “Solow-residual” when the factor shares for the 
contribution of physical and human capital are subtracted from output. 
Starting with the familiar Cobb Douglas production function and assuming constant 
returns to scale, output Y in time period t is a function of capital K, labor L adjusted for 
quality by H, and all other factors in that time period, A. Variables are subscripted by t. 
The marginal return on physical capital, a, is assumed based on experience and other 
estimates to be 0.35, while the return on human capital is 0.65, for the world in general.
25 




Worker quality H is assumed to be a function of average schooling per worker, s. The 
rate of return to education in Africa has been estimated at 13%.  Two functional forms 
are found in the literature: 
2.a  H  =  (1.13)
s 
                                                 
25 See for example Bosworth & Collins (2003), Cohen & Soto (2001) or Gosh and Kraay (2001). 
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2.b  H  =  e
0.13s 
 
Suppose for the moment we choose the first form for average human capital, (2.a). 
Following numerous other authors,  we divide through by the labor force to obtain an 
equation explaining per capita output (y = Y/L) as a function of physical capital stock per 
worker (k = K/L), average schooling per worker s over time, and TFP per worker (a = 
A/L).  Taking the natural logarithm and differentiating with respect to time (or 
differencing for estimation purposes) we obtain:  
3.  dlny/dt = dlna/dt + adlnk/dt  + (1-a)sln(1.13) 
  
This functional form has the advantage that it is stated in growth rates, independent of 
units (currency units or manpower headcounts) and independent of conversion factors 
between capital, output, and labor.  One then finds the rate of change in per capita TFP 
over time by re-arranging this equation, subtracting from the growth of output the share-
weighted growth rates of capital per worker and the presumed growth in worker 
effectiveness as measured by average years schooling. 
 
Comparison With Deterministic TFP Estimates by the World Bank 
Sandeep Matajan (2003) has recently developed robust estimates of Solow-residual total 
factor productivity and the other related variable for numerous  countries. These are 
found on the World Bank’s intranet.  These estimates are shown below, in Figure A-4. 
To compare these estimates with those generated in this paper, Figure A-5 presents the 
Mahajan estimates in index form.  These are readily comparable with the indices created 
for this paper found on Figure 10.  The major difference is that this paper focuses on per 
worker productivity, capital, TFP, etc.  To make the Mahajan estimates more comparable, 
one might subtract the difference of logs of the labor force (labor force growth) from 
Mahajan’s capital stock growth rate and TFP growth, dragging down estimated TFP.  In 
any event, the TFP indices created for this paper and the indices created from these 
World Bank sources have the same general profile.  
 
The World Bank spreadsheet includes a summary for Cote d’Ivoire, presented in Figure 
14  These also are not in per-worker form.  They are quite like the estimates in this paper: 
output, physical capital and TFP grow strongly in the 1960s and 1970s, and weakly 
thereafter. In particular they grow more slowly than the labor force, so would be 
resoundingly negative (like ours) if put in per-worker terms. Human capital grows 
strongly throughout (like ours), as the labor force grows, and increases in quality.  
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Figure A-4: Estimates of Changes in TFP, Capital Stock and Human Capital (Mahajan, 2003) 























































































Figure A-5: Indices of TFP, Physical & Human Capital (Mahajan, 2003) 
Cote d'Ivoire: Indices of Real GDP, Capital Stock, 
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These two sets of estimates (in this paper versus those of Mahajan) were arrived at 
independently, and differ in assumptions and details of their calculations, and perhaps 
some differences in input data. Nevertheless, they present very similar profiles of the 
evolution of TFP and its components for Cote d’Ivoire. 
Table A-2:  TFP, Physical & Human Capital Growth (Mahajan, 2003) 
Growth Rate 
Summary  1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 1961-2000 
GDP   8.71 7.61 -0.24 2.84  4.46 
Capital Stock   10.54 10.22 2.55 0.43  5.76 
Human Capital  3.70 4.39 4.20 4.58  4.22 
TFP 2.28 0.89 -3.77 -0.09  -0.37 
For Cote d’Ivoire.  Source: Pradeep Mahajan, PRMEP, 2003, World Bank  
 
Stochastic Regression Model of Factor Productivity 
We now turn from a deterministic “accounting” model of factor productivity (which 
asserts parameter values) to a stochastic regression model of factor productivity (which 
estimates parameter values).  By fitting such a model, we can verify to some extent the 
validity of the analysis in the last section. We will use the capital and labor-quality 




We performed standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests (assuming no constant or 
trend in the ADF test equation) on the natural logarithms (logs) of the variables we used: 
real output per worker and estimated capital stock per worker (in constant local currency, 
CFA franc), schooling per worker, and the index of terms of trade (normalized to unity).  
As expected, there existed unit roots in the levels, but all variables  were integrated of 
order one (stationary in the first differences). The ADF Z(t) statistic was less than 5% 
critical value in all cases, usually less than 1%.  So, our point of departure is to estimate 
the regressions in the first differences (an error-correction model exists for the levels). 
Since these are logged variables (except for average schooling), the first differences are 
the estimates of the growth rates. 
 
The results were satisfactory, especially when on considers that the sample is small, the 
main explanatory variables were estimates we constructed, and that many analysts have 
experienced major difficulties with data from Sub-Saharan Africa.
27  Furthermore, there 
is presumably a whole host of other omitted factors (variables) “explaining” productivity, 
such as policy, warfare, institutional factors, politics, the environment, and so forth. 
                                                 
26 See Bosworth & Collins (2003), Cohen & Sots (2001), and Ghosh & Kraay (2000) 
27 For example, Bosworth and Collins did not extend their global TFP estimates to Africa in their paper 
“The Empirics of Growth: An Update”, September 22, 2003.  
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A point of departure is simple, univariate, ordinary least squares (OLS) model of growth 
of output per worker as a function of the growth of capital stock per worker (A-3). 
 
Table A-3: Output growth as a Function of Capital Accumulation 
 






T-Statistic    
Delta Log, Capital per Worker  0.52967  5.36 
Constant 0.00282  0.43 
 
Durbin-Watson d-Statistic: 1.859        R-Squared: 0.42               F(1,40) = 28.7 
ADF test on residual: Z(t) = -5.818 > 1% Critical Value 
 
Define: Coefficient on average capital/worker = b1 
             Test:   b  =  .35    F(1,40) =  3.30    Prob > F = 0 .0767 
 
This univariate OLS regression seems surprisingly robust.  The residuals are reasonably 
well-behaved, and the capital coefficient estimate is of plausible magnitude with the 
correct sign and a small standard error, hence yielding a “good” T-statistic. This one 
variable “explains” a considerable part of the dependent variable. We conduct a test of 
whether the coefficient estimate equals the “standard” of 0.35 and reject the hypothesis, 
accepting the alternative hypothesis that it is higher than 0.35.  Capital stock per worker 
is a major determinant of productivity in Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
Consider next a bivariate “factor” model of productivity, which adds a term for human 
capital to the univariate regression above, in this case the first differences of our estimate 
of average schooling per worker.  The schooling coefficient point estimate comes in at b2 
= 0.0553, not far from the “ballpark” expected value of 0.079 (which we would revise 
downward anyway if we accept the proposition that Cote d’Ivoire has a high MPK and 
hence a > 0.35).  However, the coefficient estimate has a wide confidence interval and 
low T.  It seems that our estimate of human capital is imprecise, but of some utility. 
 
Total Factor Productivity in a deterministic framework is a residual, that share of output 
that is not attributed to quality-adjusted labor (human capital) or physical capital.  The 
concept of “Solow-residual” TFP is not directly observable; there is no times series of 
direct observations to rely upon.  For the regression analysis, analysts have traditionally 
used proxy variables or instrumental variables, ranging from the urbanization rate or 
population, to trend variables, and so forth.  But, in Cote d’Ivoire specifically and (and in 
some other developing countries
28 TFP growth over time is not a simple quasi-linear 
trend; it grew in the 1960s and 1970s and plunged thereafter. Proxies or instruments must 
be carefully selected. 
 
                                                 
28 See for example Bosworth and Collins (2003).  
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We noted during the analysis that the TPF measured in the last section by accounting 
methods had a time profile rather similar to the time profile of the terms of trade. Recall, 
the terms of trade rose in the early years as the price index of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports rose 
above the price index for its imports; later the reverse occurred.  From an empirical point 
of view, terms of trade seemed a good proxy or instrument for TFP.   
 
From a conceptual perspective, much of  Cote d’Ivoire’s output is sold abroad, while 
many physical capital and other production inputs are purchased from abroad. So, if 
world prices for commodity exports increases, the extra value added contributes to the 
“residual”, TFP. If prices of imported production inputs increase, the residual value 
added is reduced. That is, for a small trading economy, the terms of trade impact the 
value added of economic production.  In a sense, we are simply inserting relative world 
prices into the equations of the Cobb-Douglas production function considered earlier. If 
Cote d’Ivoire is a price taker on world markets, these prices are exogenous. 
 
 Table A-4 presents the coefficient estimates and measures of “goodness of fit” for a 
regression “explaining” the rate of growth of output per worker as a result of the growth 
rate of physical capital per worker, the increase of average schooling per worker 
(representing growth in human capital), and the rate of change of the terms of trade. The 
rate of change of the terms of trade is taken as an important determinant of or proxy for 
Total Factor Productivity. 
 
Table A-4: Cobb-Douglas Regression Estimation Results of a Factor Productivity 
Model for the Cote d'Ivoire, 1960-2002 






T-Statistic      
Delta Log, Capital per Worker  0.56473  4.31 
Delta, Average Schooling per Worker  0.05528  0.32 
Delta Log Terms of Trade  0.10019  2.77 
Constant -  0.00465  0,17 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.9607        R-Squared: 0.52               F(5,36) = 13.5 
ADF test on residual: Z(t) = -6.153  > 1% Critical Value 
 
The coefficient point estimates for the contributions of physical capital and human capital 
(schooling) differ somewhat from the values often assumed in the literature, and from 
those which were assumed in the accounting TPF estimate presented earlier, but not 
enough to warrant recalculating TFP. A one percent change in the rate of change in terms 
of trade results in a one-tenth of a percent change in the measured value of per capita 
output. 
 
More polished versions of this model might be obtained with further effort. The results 
seem to generally validate the TFP accounting estimates, which showed a decline in TFP 
in recent years in Cote d’Ivoire, rather than growth.  The results also suggest that for 
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small open trading countries like Cote d’Ivoire, the terms of trade are important 
explanatory factors for economic productivity and output growth. 
 
We experimented, substituting the literacy rate for our schooling measure. The 
coefficient point estimate was large and negative, albeit with a rather large confidence 
interval and low t-statistic. We conclude that however imprecise our schooling measure 
may be, especially as a measure of worker quality, it is better than the literacy rate, and 
better than leaving it out. 
 
The civil war reduced growth. We also found that a dummy variable for the war in 2000-
2002 had a coefficient of the right sign and plausible magnitude, with a t-statistic of 
1.21
29. Our best estimate is that the occurrence of the minor conflicts of 2000-2002 
knocked 3.8% off the expected growth rates for those three years, for a cumulative effect 
of 11% for the three years.
30  This is a very conservative estimate on at least two 
considerations.  One, it does not take into account the indirect effect on growth via 
reduced capital investment due to fear of war; capital stock is simply taken as given in 
this model.  Two, the turmoil in 2000-02 mild compared with the civil war that broke out 
in September 2002.   
                                                 
29 The coefficient point estimate was -.03765 with a standard deviation of 0.03123 
30 (1 – 03765) raised to the power of three approximately equals 0.8912. 
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Deriving Specific Hypotheses for Expected Parameter Values 
Theoretically, the functional form of our productivity model is given by the usual Cobb-Douglas 
production function, where output is a function of physical capital, quality adjusted labor, and 






There are two candidate functional forms for L* which are approximately equivalent: 
L* = L x H(1) = L(1 + r)
S       or        L* =  L x H(2) = Le
rs
 
We divide through by L to put the equation in output and capital per worker form, denoted with 
lower case letters. We take natural logarithms to make the equation linear and additive, and then 
differentiate with respect to time to put the equation into growth rates.  This gives us our 
Population Regression Function (PRF): 
(PRF) dlny/dt = dlnc(t)/dt +adlnk/dt +(1- a)ln(1+r)ds/dt + B1lnX’1 + B2X’2 
The point is that depending on the functional form assumed for H, the rate of return to education 
r or ln(1+r) is associated with the labor factor share (1 – a) and the first differences of the 
variable s, the average years schooling per worker. The Sample Regression Function (SRF) that 
we estimate is: 
(SRF)   dlny/dt =   c + b1dlnk/dt +  b2ds/dt + B1lnX’1 + B2X’2 
Suppose for a moment, as is commonly assumed, that the exponent associated with physical 
capital is 0.35, so that the coefficient associated with human capital or quality adjusted labor is 
0.65. Suppose also that the rate of return to education (RRE) in Africa is high, at 13%.  Then we 
can assign “ballpark” numeric values to the expected values of our sample regression parameter 
estimates for b1 and  b2 , under the hypothesis that our PRF and SRF set-up is correct, as follows: 
E{b1}  =  Capital Contribution  =  a  = 0.65 
E{b2}  =  Labor Contribution x  RRE   
= (1 – a)ln(1 + r) =  (0.65) x ln(1.13)  =  0.0794 
Alternately, one may substitute (0.65) x (0.13) above. (Note that the assumption a = 0.35 is 
considered appropriate for the world economy in general, which dominated by developed 
countries.)  Furthermore, care may be taken that other explanatory variables are entered either in 
logarithmic or linear form, as appropriate. 
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Productivity Regression Data 
LNTERMS lnYL  lnKL  lnIL  war 
0.195597075 13.56567206 13.50273294  11.89418359  0 
0.01213893 13.63036667 13.62127714  12.12622101  0 
0.021042458 13.61172432 13.64749306  11.74977866  0 
0.151887531 13.71530307 13.72974085  12.10498303  0 
0.25689101 13.84523414  13.8664145  12.43896993  0 
0.029280476 13.78023699 13.95758233  12.3748589  0 
0.029616206 13.85586063 14.04091473  12.42936888  0 
0.029838754 13.86631216 14.09152501  12.33956417  0 
0.029626057 13.94951388 14.13135339  12.32891306  0 
0.189000861 14.00529411 14.18982621  12.47827683  0 
0.251450053 14.06818833  14.2661494  12.63382669  0 
-0.101907909 14.12263346 14.32056897  12.59311052  0 
-0.17044778 14.12798729 14.35260476  12.5157202  0 
-0.029818544 14.14973089 14.41213075  12.70813534  0 
-0.000169234 14.15637593 14.45174492  12.65180422  0 
-0.157882317 14.20042949 14.48416046  12.64456177  0 
0.096952618 14.28760116 14.54573116  12.84352773  0 
0.429270084 14.32429473 14.66200971  13.17257834  0 
0.325652654 14.39422697 14.77892189  13.29067691  0 
0.210898166 14.38446377 14.84979958  13.18454659  0 
-0.329401347 14.23520265 14.85368109  12.8345015  0 
-0.406058584 14.23716263 14.84849998  12.76269524  0 
-0.440588359 14.20712239 14.82894764  12.63229558  0 
-0.39604346 14.13548553 14.77965293  12.30467933  0 
-0.20695394 14.07657855 14.67993138  11.36893371  0 
-0.108144709 14.08917538 14.61392576  11.93065665  0 
-0.090770041 14.09053262 14.56639144  12.09817457  0 
-0.275403535 14.05678211  14.502942  11.83828643  0 
-0.359202156 14.03819959 14.43531628  11.70781768  0 
-0.530332274 14.03792584 14.36600448  11.6058994  0 
-0.671972802 13.99795397  14.2813417  11.25386316  0 
-0.594356155 13.95621218 14.19273022  11.33151038  0 
-0.54704525 13.91247921 14.10299895  11.20845635  0 
-0.452924182 13.87027389 14.03586067  11.45222126  0 
0.012437816 13.8386791  13.97704984  11.4834388  0 
0 13.86865956 13.94677499  11.71824886  0 
-0.024464384 13.91042456 13.93213469  11.77879731  0 
-0.035204369 13.93521491 13.92236837  11.79175492  0 
-0.038491072 13.95210215 13.90524995  11.70794878  0 
-0.023978592 13.94013457  13.8942581  11.73062068  0 
-0.194188598 13.88870187 13.86642245  11.55075334  1 
-0.204096314 13.86531137 13.81455389  11.25330228  1 
-0.209580099 13.82169785 13.76282549  11.18410469  1 
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How Terms of Trade Impact TFP 
Here we first present an intuitive explanation of why the terms of trade impact measured 
Total Factor Productivity in a trading nation like Cote d’Ivoire which imports capital 
goods and production inputs, and then sells part of its output abroad.We have 
observations of the value of GDP or output. We calculate an estimate of the output 
contribution of quality adjusted labor, and then the output contribution of physical capital 
stock. The residual or difference is not attributable to capital or labor is “total factor 
productivity” or TFP.   

















Yt, equals output quantities times output prices, and includes the share of output exported 
abroad at export prices, Pt
xQt
x, as well as the share of output consumed domestically 
Pt
dQt
d.  If the price of exports (P) goes up, the value of exported physical output (Q) 
goes up, and consequently the value of GDP (Y) goes up even if physical quantity 
volumes are held constant. This causes calculated TFP to go up. That is, if the terms of 
trade improve due to an increase in the prices for exports, the value added in production 
goes up in a manner not attributable to the two factors of production, physical labor or 
human capital (labor), so the “residual” estimated TFP goes up. If prices of exports on the 
world market goes up (or down), the terms of trade improve, and the value of an 
exporter’s GDP goes up (or down).     
To produce GDP, investments are made in the physical capital stock and factor inputs, 
such as vehicles and machinery and fuel, some of which is imported. Consider a 
deterioration in the terms of trade caused by an increase in the price level of imported 
capital goods. If the price level of those imported capital items required for production 
goes up, the estimated share of total output or GDP attributable to capital goes up. All 
else equal, if GDP is held constant, the calculated TFP goes down when the terms of 
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trade deteriorates due to increases in the price level of imported capital and inputs (and 
vice versa). 
More formally, in the “Solow Residual” framework, total factor productivity is defined 
as: 
TFP  =  GNP  - (contribution of capital) – (contribution of labor)    
TFP  =   Y -  aK  -  (1 – a)L* 
Or, TFP equals the value of units of output less the marginal product of capital times the 
value of capital and less the marginal product of labor time quality-adjusted labor: 
TFP      =   PQ  -   MPK(P
kK)  - MPL(L*)  
Decompose output into the value of exports plus the value of output consumed 
domestically, and decompose capital into the value of capital imported from abroad plus 
the value of domestically produced capital: 
TFP  =  (P
xQ
x  +  P
cQ




d)  - wL* 
This definition of TFP holds as an identify.  If we differentiate this identity with respect 
to the price level of  exports, we obtain a positive derivative: 
   dTPF/dP
x  >  0 
Similarly, if we differentiate with respect to the price level of imports applied to capital, 
we obtain a negative derivative: 
   dTPF/dP
M  <  0 
Hence for a trading exporting nation which is a price-taker on world markets and imports 
capital goods and production inputs, we expect fluctuations in the terms of trade 
(incorporating the ratio of the price levels of imports and exports) to impact Solow-
residual TFP so defined in the manner described here.  For such nations, we might expect 
the terms of trade index (or alternately the price levels of imports and for exports) to be a 
good proxy for TFP in Cobb-Douglas-style productivity regression models. 
There is literature on how the terms of trade affect macroeconomic performance.   
Analysts at the IMF have studied how commodity price “shocks” impact economies
31. 
The literature seems to focus on the impact on exchange rates, and the real exchange rate, 
rather than productivity or Solow-residual-TFPs per se.  Here, we provide evidence that 
commodity price innovations may directly impact measured productivity. It seems very 
reasonable that the measured output growth of a commodity exporting nation may be 
impacted by external price shocks, or price trends, in a manner independent of factor 
                                                 
31 See for example Cashin (2003), Cashin et al (2003), Chen and Rogoff (2002).   
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employment within the country,  This literature notes that commodity price time series 
are characterized by small downward long-term trends and a great deal of volatility. 
Some 44 developing nations depend on four commodity exports or less
32. 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
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ANNEX TWO: Some Comparisons of Cote d’Ivoire’s Growth Record  
Cross Country Comparisons 
How did Cote d’Ivoire’s growth compare with that of other developing countries? This 
section compares recent per capita real growth in GDP
33 for several peer groups of 
countries versus Cote d’Ivoire for the most recent, ten year period 1993 to 2002, and the 
ten-year average. First, we compare Cote d’Ivoire to other African and poor countries.  
Then we more on to compare her with other CFA countries, and other countries in Africa 
experiencing conflict.  Cote d’Ivoire grew more slowly than any of these benchmark peer 
groups. 
Other Developing Countries 
Summary benchmarks and comparisons: 
•  Sub-Saharan Africa  (48 countries) The Sub-Saharan Countries as a group 
averaged 2.90% growth over the decade, more than half a percent more than Cote 
d’Ivoire.
34 
•  West Africa (23 countries) Cote D’Ivoire ranked 18
th in this group for the decade.  
West Africa grew at a 4.6% average annual rate for the decade, more than 2.2% faster 
than Cote d’Ivoire   
•  Poor Countries (63 countries with 2002 per capita GDI less than $735) Measured 
by average growth over the decade of 1993-2002, Cote d’Ivoire ranked 39
th out of the 61 
poor countries for which statistics are available.  The poor countries as a group averaged 
3.52% growth for the decade versus 2.36% for Cote d’Ivoire. 
 
Figure A-7 shows plots West African average annual growth against that of Cote 
d’Ivoire. Both Cote d’Ivoire and West Africa  emerged from a slump in 1993 to grow 
strongly in the post-devaluation period. This is in part due to the fact that many West 
African countries are CFA countries, which suffered together from currency over-
valuation until 1994, and then benefited from the large and long-awaited devaluation in 
January 1994.  But West Africa as a whole posted even stronger growth in 1997, while 
Cote d’Ivoire experienced a downturn. From 1998 to 2002, West Africa grew at about 
5% while Cote d’Ivoire did not grow at all, posting negative growth in 2000 and 2002.  
While West Africa as a whole turned around in the mid 1990s and began to grow again, 
Cote d’Ivoire experienced an ephemeral upturn and slipped back into decline. 
                                                 
33 From SIMA, in constant 1995 US dollars. 
34 There are simple arithmetic averages of  reported growth rates; they are not weighted by population. 
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Figure A-7: Comparison of Growth in Cote d’Ivoire to West Africa 
 




























































Figure A-8:  Comparison of Growth in Cote d’Ivoire to West Zone CFA Countries 
 
Cote d'Ivoire Verus Eight Western Zone CFA Countries:

























































Western CFA Franc Zone: One narrower  peer group for comparison is the eight 
countries that share the CFA Franc in the CFA Western zone. They share to some extent 
culture, regional ties, and colonial heritage
35, as well as sharing a currency. The Banque 
Central des Etats d l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) acts as a common central bank for the 
                                                 
35 Except for Guinea Bissau, a former Portuguese colony. 
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West African Economic and Monetary Union.  Figure A-8 shows a graph of annual per 
capita growth in real output for Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the arithmetic average for the 
western eight CFA countries which share the CFA franc.  Table 6 provides the same 
information in greater detail, showing the per capita growth rates for each country. 
Looking at the graph, we see that Cote d’Ivoire tracks the average of the eight western  
CFA countries,  moving more or less in line with them all, but has lower growth on 
average than the group.  The west CFA group responded to the December 1994 
devaluation of the CFA with strong growth, which continued for a few years and then 
died out. Looking at Table A-5 reveals considerable variation.   
Table A-5: Per Capita Real Growth Rates in CFA West Zone Countries, 1993-2002 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Averag
Benin 3.52 4.37 4.60 5.55 6.15 4.54 4.70 5.76 5.02 6.01 5.02
Mali 0.91 6.21 3.22 6.76 6.03 6.73 13.29 4.37 4.20
Burkina Faso 4.60 1.00 4.60 7.10 5.20 1.00 6.70 1.60 4.60 4.60 4.10
Senegal 2.87 5.17 5.14 5.04 5.74 5.00 5.58 5.57 1.10 3.90
Niger 1.45 4.00 2.61 3.42 2.75 10.42 7.10 2.98 3.28
Cote d'Ivoire 0.81 7.13 7.73 5.72 4.75 1.58 0.35 2.36
Togo 14.98 7.85 8.84 4.25 2.38 4.61 2.36





(15.10) (2.10) (1.91) (0.21)
(28.10) (7.20)
(1.00) BCEAO Average 4.02 5.32 6.57 5.30 0.29 4.29 1.41 4.49 1.83 3.25  
 
Cote d’Ivoire is a relatively weak performer  within this group, averaging 2.36% average 
annual growth per capita versus 3.25% for the group. Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali 
and Niger all grew faster than the Cote d’Ivoire.  Only Guinea-Bissau grew more slowly. 
The fact that Cote d’Ivoire posts slower growth than other nearby CFA countries suggests 
that the currency arrangements and exchange rate issues have not been the only causes of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s slow growth. Most other nearby countries with the same currency 
managed to grow faster in the last decade. 
African Countries in Conflict:  Civil strife and war are prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
providing yet another benchmark for comparison.  Table A-6 provides real per capita 
GDP growth rates for eleven Sub Saharan countries, which experienced either civil war 
or war with a neighboring country during the 1992-2002 period.  These conflicts range in 
scale, intensity, duration and timing. 
These results may be skewed by the inclusion of Liberia, which experienced strong 
growth in the mid 1990s as the country began to recover from it’s brutal civil war.  Cote 
d’Ivoire performed below the average in this sample, ranking below the mid point, based 
on the ten-year average. Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Rwanda and Angola all 
averaged faster growth over the decade. Cote d’Ivoire outperformed Congo (Brazzaville), 
Sierra Leone, Burundi and Congo (Kinshasa).   
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Table A-6: Real GDP Growth Per Capita, Selected African States Experiencing Conflict, 1993-2002 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average
Liberia (32.98)     (21.76)  (4.27)     12.12    106.28    29.70    22.90     20.40    4.90     3.30     14.06   
Ethiopia 13.36      3.49      6.12      10.91    5.38       (1.86)     6.20       5.74      8.88     2.72     6.09     
Eritrea 13.37      21.22    2.86      9.25      7.90       1.78      (0.01)      (13.15)  10.22  1.81     5.53     
Sudan 4.57        1.01      6.00      5.92      6.34       6.44      6.46       5.14      6.10     5.52     5.35     
Rwanda (8.11)       (50.25)  35.22    12.75    13.85      8.86      7.58       5.97      6.72     9.38     4.20     
Angola (24.70)     3.50      10.40    11.20    7.90       6.80      3.35       3.04      3.17     15.30  4.00     
Cote d'Ivoire (0.19)       0.81      7.13      7.73      5.72       4.75      1.58       (2.47)     0.35     (1.82)    2.36     
Congo, Rep. (1.00)       (5.50)     5.00      4.30      (0.60)      3.70      (3.00)      8.20      3.60     3.50     1.82     
Sierra Leone 1.38        (1.95)     (8.00)     6.09      (17.60)     (0.88)     (8.08)      3.81      5.40     6.30     (1.35)    
Burundi (5.71)       (3.86)     (7.27)     (8.36)     0.37       4.78      (0.97)      (0.90)     3.20     3.60     (1.51)    
Congo, Dem (13.47)     (3.90)     0.70      (1.02)     (5.62)      (1.62)     (4.40)      (7.00)     (2.00)    3.00     (3.53)    
Average (4.86)       (5.20)     4.90      6.44      11.81      5.68      9.25       2.62      4.59     4.78     3.36       
Peace may bring opportunity to advance. Countries that resolve their conflicts, or at least 
end or mitigate them, often grow strongly in subsequent years.  There are numerous 
examples, including Liberia and Sudan and Rwanda recently, and Uganda in earlier 
years.  There can be a distinct “bounce-back” effect; countries resolving their conflicts 
often recover by growing rapidly for a period of several years, albeit from a lowered 
base. If Cote d’Ivoire can resolve it’s difficulties, the result may be growth. 
 
Many of these African countries experienced very severe conflict, and still managed to 
grow faster than Cote d’Ivoire. That simple fact may suggest that the recent conflict is not 
the sole or single major cause of Cote d’Ivoire’s slow growth, which after all has 
persisted now for more than two decades. 
 
According to statistics released by the Center for Systematic Peace, the civil war in Cote 
d’Ivoire started in 2000 and as of 2002 was still continuing, with about 2,500 “directly 
related” deaths
36.  They list it as a low-intensity conflict, with a new outbreak in 2002, 
with “conflict magnitude” or severity rated as only “2” on a scale of 1 to 10
37. This is a 
rather small conflict by African standards.  In nearby smaller Guinea-Bissau 6,000 died 
in the 1998-99 coup and civil war. Some 100,000 Eritreans died in the 1998-2000 war 
with Ethiopia.  More than 1.5 million died in Congo (Zaire) between 1996 and 2002. 
Some 500,000 died in little Rwanda in 1994 alone. Civil war claimed 25,000 in Sierra 
Leone between 1991 and 2001.Over a million have died in the last twenty years in Sudan.  
So, things could easily get much worse in Cote d’Ivoire if the conflict is not resolved.   
The outbreak of civil war in 2003 has not yet been rated in terms of “magnitude”, but is 
presumably much worse than the earlier conflict. 
                                                 
36 See the website maintained by M. Marshall, 2003. 
37 See also Marshall & Gurr, 2003. 
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